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Abstract—Botnets, networks of compromised machines 
remotely controlled and instructed to work in a coordinated 
fashion, have had an epidemic diffusion over the Internet and 
represent one of today's most insidious threat. In this paper, 
we present an open framework called Dorothy that permits to 
monitor the activity of a botnet. We propose to characterize a 
botnet behavior through a set of parameters and a graphical 
representation. In a case study, we infiltrated and monitored a 
botnet named siwa collecting information about its functional 
structure, geographical distribution, communication 
mechanisms, command language and operations.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A botnet is a network of compromised machines 
remotely controlled and instructed to work in a coordinated 
fashion by one or more management hosts. Botnets are 
responsible of severe Internet threats, like many Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDoS), spam campaigns, and phishing 
activity. A large part of today malware epidemics can be 
related to the spreading activity of botnets [1, 2, 3, 4]. 
Key to the operations of a botnet is the availability of an 
efficient communication mechanism between the few hosts 
in charge of control and management tasks, usually called 
Command and Control (C&C), and the many, easily in the 
order of thousands up to millions in some cases [5], slave 
hosts usually called zombies.  
In this paper, we present a new framework called Dorothy 
that aims to automatically perform all the main steps of 
botnet tracking and to provide real-time data, statistics and 
graphical representations.  
Botnets, since their appearance, have often adopted IRC 
channels for their communication between C&C hosts and 
zombies [6]. Subsequently, the focus of botnet analysis 
shifted on different technologies, in particular to Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) botnets [5]. However, IRC botnets are still 
proliferating and evolving from plain, standard IRC channels 
to hidden and minimal or encrypted channels. 
Correspondingly, IRC botnet analysis must evolve to cope 
with a reduced set of options for estimating a botnet size, to 
escape from controls put in place by botmasters to avoid 
infiltration by fake bots, and to manage obfuscation 
techniques applied for obscuring the semantics of the 
communication language. 
For example, in our analyses, we have found just two 
C&C hosts over sixteen still relying on plain, standard IRC 
communications, with no channel restrictions. All the others 
had disabled information gathering commands and 
moderated all channels communication. In all cases 
botmasters were monitoring the joining of new bots to the 
IRC channel, providing for automatic response mechanisms 
that permanently banned source IP addresses when 
anomalies or errors in the command language usage were 
noted. In some cases, retaliation counteractions in the form 
of DDoS were activated when the fake bot was spotted.  
One method adopted in this work to mitigate the effects 
of such retaliation actions has been to rely on anonymous 
proxies and the TOR Network [7] to conceive our IP address 
during the infiltration process. 
II. METRICS FOR BOTNET ANALYSIS 
Understanding and characterizing a botnet's structure is 
still an open issue. Size estimation, hidden structures and the 
botnet development cycle is hard to investigate, although 
researchers have recently proposed novel approaches [8, 9]. 
In general, the first step is to identify the roles of the 
machines involved. This requires to recognize which hosts 
are acting as C&Cs, which are satellites (i.e., hosts in charge 
of complementary and supporting operations) and finally 
which are acting as zombies. Counting zombies which 
acknowledge to C&C's commands, unfortunately, most of 
the time, just gives a vague estimation of today's botnet size. 
The reason is that many of these botnets are rooted by 
different C&Cs, each one instructing only a branch of the 
whole network and because often, for a specific activity, just 
part of the botnet is activated.  
In our work, we suggest that a better description could be 
achieved through a vector of several parameters and a rich  
graphical representation. In particular, we have identified 
nine main parameters, as presented in Table 1. 
III. THE DOROTHY ARCHITECTURE 
The architecture of Dorothy is composed of several 
software modules implementing all different phases of the 
automatic joining to an IRC channel, tracking, analysis and 
graphical representation of botnet activity (see Figure 1). The 
ones on which we have mostly concentrated our contribution 
are: the Infiltration Module (IM) and the Data Visualization 
Module (DVM). 
 
TABLE I.  BOTNET'S PARAMETERS  
Parameter Description 
C&C Number of C&C hosts related to the same botnet 
Malwares Number of malware used for infecting new zombies 
C&C Satellites Number of servers offering complementary features to C&C, such as downloading malwares 
IRC Channels Number of different IRC channels used for C&C-Zombie communications. 
Ports Number of different TCP ports available for IRC communications 
Zombies Number of unique zombies identified as joined to an IRC channel  
Hosts 
Number of unique host names resolved by zombies 
through DNS queries. associated to the C&C hosts. 
This value may give an estimate of the botnet 
strength with respect to black listing mechanisms. 
ALL-Host 
Number of unique host names resolved by zombies 
through DNS queries. This value is likely to be 
correlated to the amount of spam activity 
Mail 
Number of different email addresses used as 
destination by Zombies. As the previous one, also 
this value is likely to be related to spam activity 
 
A. Infiltration Module (IM) 
The IM represents the Dorothy’s drone, a tool that 
simulates the features of a standard IRC client to permit the 
joining to an IRC channel. It is implemented with Unix bash 
scripts. Differently from a standard IRC client, a drone must 
be able to mimic the peculiarities of the specific message 
protocol and language implemented in botnet 
communication. For example, usual automatic features 
embedded in standard IRC clients must be removed, such as 
automatic join, automatic execution of LIST or WHO 
commands, or automatic respose to a VERSION request. If 
executed, such actions, many of the botnets analyzed would 
have reacted by permanently banning the client IP address. 
Therefore, the drone should be as stealthy as possible and 
should not reveal its own information. A requirement for the 
Dorothy's drone was to establish connection with C&C 
hosts trough an anonymization service to protect our 
identity from retaliation actions. The drawback of this 
solution is that it increases the transmission delay, which 
could appear to a C&C as an insufficient quality of 
transmission and provoke the disconnection of the client.  
B. Data Visualization Module (DVM) 
Studing different means of visualizing information 
related to botnets behavior is a key goal of the project. The 
DVM automatically provide all graphs by means of 
AfterGlow scripts [10]. Data available for visualization are 
received by the DVM from previous modules and are 
characterized on a three dimensions matrix whose 
parameters are: Source, Service, and Target. Given this 
representation, the DVM first produce a link graph of the 
relationships between zombies and other hosts. Nodes 
properties in the link graph are identified by color, shape, 
and dimension. Some data aggregation are performed, such 
as for IP addresses, data gathered from IRC communication, 
and mail traffic. 
It is also possible to merge several dumps of network 
traffic and to process them as a whole using the same 
visualization information process used to produce the link 
graph for a single zombie.  
 
Figure 1.  The modular architecture of Dorothy. 
IV. RESULTS 
The Dorothy framework was tested for a period of 27 
days between January and March 2009. This was the first 
test of the system with live malwares. During this period, 
Dorothy downloaded 3900 (304 unique) malware binaries 
(562,657 Mb) and our honeypot was successfully 
compromised 5291 time. All the malware binaries were 
downloaded from 2210 unique IP address, using 2275 
different source TCP ports. In particular, a large proportion 
of malwares were downloaded by few sources (i.e., three IP 
addresses accounted for about 80% of malwares); 16 
different C&Cs were identified and 50 IRC channels have 
been successfully infiltrated by the drone. 
Of the monitored C&Cs, four plainly responded to WHO 
and LUSER IRC commands, showing all zombie identities. 
Four instead simply ignored any command. The others, in 
some cases accepted a command, but eventually 
disconnected the drone and permanently banned the IP 
address. Interestingly, in four cases it was possible to 
intercept the short timeframe in which the botmaster disabled 
the channel moderation, which let us watching and recording 
all the conversations between C&Cs and zombies. These 
short intervals were probably a sign of a reconfiguration 
activity performed by the botmaster. About the command 
issued, nearly half of the cases the connection was encrypted, 
and for those unencrypted channels, the great deal of activity 
was devoted to enlarge the botnet. From the acquired data, it 
was possible to recognize three different Spam Centers and a 
total of 3157 unique email addresses. 
The infiltration process has recorded 8992 unique public  
network addresses. These hosts represents zombie connected 
to the monitored C&Cs. Of these, 44,5% were found to be 
unresolved host name. 
V. CASE STUDY: THE SIWA BOTNET 
The siwa botnet has been monitored in detail during the 
test. It is formed by five C&C hosts located in China (2), 
Canada (2) and Holland (1). The botnet makes use of seven 
IRC channels called: #siwa, ##russia##, ##loose, ##pi##, 
#bb, #ns, and #q52. The first two were encrypted, but from 
the others it was possible to monitor the ongoing activity. 
For example, one command issued by the C&C was: 
##pi## :* ipscan s.s dcom2 -s ][ * wormride on -s 
][ * download http://72.xxx.xxx.xxx/mb2.exe -e –s 
This was meant to instruct the zombies to start a 
spreading activity towards the hosts in their own network 
(s.s is a shortcut for 255.255.0.0) using the dcom2 module. 
Furthermore, it enabled the exploit module wormride 
(wormride is a known Internet worm used to compromise 
Windows DCOM services) and then downloaded and 
executed the file mb2.exe from the specified HTTP site. 
As a consequence, the zombies sent the acknowledgment:  
72.xxx.xxx.xxx:2293 --> 
:QfNUXNcm!~xqbmgz@92.xxx.xxx.xxx PRIVMSG 
##RUSSIA## :-041- Running FTP wormride thread 
72.xxx.xxx.xxx:2293  --> :Tdkzdtwh!~bxoluj@mna75-
4-82-225-77-1.yyy.yyy.net PRIVMSG ##russia## :-
04wormride- 1. tftp transfer to 82.xxx.xxx.xxx 
complete. 
These two messages mean that zombies started their 
spreading activity using the new downloaded exploit module 
after its thread activation, uploading it via the tftp protocol. 
From this log fragment, it is also possible to see the different 
usage of IRC channels. 
Next we investigated which satellite hosts were 
supporting the five C&Cs. We identified 37 different 
satellites used to distribute different malwares through HTTP 
connections. Further analyses showed that the C&C hosts 
adopted different configurations. For example, one of the 
Chinese C&C acted as both an IRC commander and as a web 
satellite. It configured TCP ports 2293, 2569, 2938, 3240, 
and 3838 for the IRC communications and TCP port 80 to 
share malwares with its own zombie community. Differently, 
the other Chinese C&C configured just TCP port 65520 for 
IRC communications, but acted also as a Spam Center, rather 
then a satellite  (i.e. about 99% of DNS queries and email 
deliveries were generated by this host). The Holland C&C, 
instead, tried to disguise IRC communication by configuring 
the channel to respond on TCP port 80. 
Associated to the siwa botnet, we discovered 42 unique 
host names. Trying to resolve these host names failed in just 
four cases. The remaining were all correctly resolved to IP 
addresses referred to either C&C or satellite hosts. 
For those IRC channels that did not make use of 
encryption or obfuscation techniques, it was possible to 
intercept conversations between zombies and C&C hosts. 
This way, we identified 4346 unique IP addresses that were 
acting as zombies. Interestingly, by monitoring each time a 
C&C instructing its zombies to download a new malware, 
we discovered that on average, this happens every 6 hours. 
Figure 2 shows the graphical representation of locations 
and links between C&C hosts and their satellites on a Google 
Map. Selecting a location on the map, real-time statistics of 
the corresponding C&C or satellite host are visualized. 
. 
 
Figure 2.  Active representation of siwa's C&C hosts and their satellites. 
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